Adjacent practices
How BROCS applies established delivery, reliability, security, platform, governance, and cost practices to enterprise AI.
BROCS draws on disciplines that already operate production systems. This guide separates the practices that transfer directly from the changes required for AI systems.
The mappings to BROCS are interpretations, not endorsements by the cited organizations. See the evidence policy.
For the wider category, see enterprise AI operations. The MLOps and GenAIOps crosswalk covers the lifecycle disciplines used by teams that already operate machine learning or generative AI systems.
DevOps and DORA (Build)
DORA defines change lead time as the interval from a change committed to version control until it runs in production.1 Apply that measure to code, prompts, tool instructions, retrieval configuration, and evals that follow a versioned delivery path.
The broader route from an approved idea to a running change is a value-stream measure. DORA distinguishes that end-to-end flow from its narrower software delivery metric.2 Measure both. The broader measure exposes delays faced by analysts and other builders who do not work through a terminal.
Prompt and tool changes need version control, tests, release gates, and retained evidence of the version tested. The OWASP AI Agent Security Cheat Sheet documents these practices for agent releases.3
SRE (Run and Observe)
Error budgets, golden signals, postmortems, and end-to-end recovery tests transfer from SRE.4 AI services add token use, tool calls, model and prompt versions, unit cost, and measures of output quality. Provider quotas also become a saturation constraint.
Service health and output quality can diverge. NIST's guidance on deployed AI calls for monitoring real-world performance and unforeseen outputs after release.5 Evals belong next to service monitors so the team can detect behavioral regressions while latency and status codes remain stable.
OpenTelemetry's Generative AI semantic conventions cover model and agent spans, tool spans, events, metrics, and token attributes.6 The conventions remain in Development, so telemetry consumers should record the convention version they implement.
SecOps and AI security (Secure)
Least privilege and credential controls apply to AI systems. Agents need a complete review of the tools and data each identity can read, change, or send. OWASP classifies excessive functionality, permissions, and autonomy as excessive agency.7
Indirect prompt injection allows untrusted content to influence control flow. OWASP lists documents, source commits, tickets, web pages, and email as potential sources.8 The EchoLeak vulnerability shows this path through an email read by an assistant.
Platform engineering (Build and Run)
Internal platforms, self-service provisioning, reusable capabilities, and secure defaults transfer directly to Build and Run. The CNCF Platforms White Paper also describes access through GUIs, APIs, command-line tools, IDEs, and portals.9 This supports a shared identity, data access, and runtime layer beneath individual assistants and agent tools.
The sanctioned path has to work for routine use. Measure adoption and fulfillment time, then fix the path when teams work around it.
Secure software delivery (Build and Secure)
NIST's Secure Software Development Framework provides practices for preparing the organization, protecting software, producing secure releases, and responding to vulnerabilities.10 SLSA adds source and build provenance for software artifacts.11
These practices transfer to code and packaged AI services. AI work extends the inventory to prompts, eval sets, tool definitions, model configuration, and retrieved data sources. Record the origin and approved version of each artifact used in a release.
GitOps and control loops (Observe and Control)
OpenGitOps defines desired state as declarative, versioned and immutable, pulled automatically, and continuously reconciled.12 Those principles apply to model routes, prompt versions, tool permissions, and runtime policy when the underlying system can reconcile them.
A control loop needs measurements, a controller that selects a change, and an actuator that applies it.13 Observe supplies the measurements; Control supplies the adjustment. Teams need actions narrower than shutting down the whole service.
GRC, NIST AI RMF, and the EU AI Act (Secure)
NIST AI RMF 1.0 organizes risk management under Govern, Map, Measure, and Manage.14 BROCS maps Map and Measure to Observe, Manage to Control, and Govern to Secure. This is a BROCS crosswalk. The NIST Generative AI Profile adds risks and actions specific to generative AI.15 NIST is currently revising AI RMF 1.0.16
The EU AI Act assigns different duties according to the system classification and the organization's role. For applicable high-risk AI systems, Articles 12, 19, and 26 cover automatic logging, retention, and deployer control of logs.17 A BROCS review asks which production systems create those records and whether the responsible team can produce them on demand.
FinOps (Observe and Secure)
FinOps practices for allocation, budgeting, timely cost data, and unit economics transfer to inference spend.18 Attribute cost by application and team, then track a unit tied to business use, such as cost per resolved case.
Monthly reporting cannot constrain a retry loop while it is running. OWASP guidance for unbounded consumption recommends input limits, rate limits, user quotas, resource controls, timeouts, and throttling during operation.19
Nathen Harvey, "DORA's software delivery performance metrics", Google Cloud DORA, updated January 5, 2026. ↩︎
Andrew Davis and Rob Edwards, "How to use value stream mapping to improve software delivery", Google Cloud DORA, updated November 13, 2024. ↩︎
OWASP Cheat Sheet Series, "AI Agent Security", accessed August 27, 2026. ↩︎
Betsy Beyer, Chris Jones, Jennifer Petoff, and Niall Richard Murphy, eds., Site Reliability Engineering (O'Reilly Media, 2016), chapters 3, 6, 15, and 26. ↩︎
Anita Rao et al., Challenges to the Monitoring of Deployed AI Systems, NIST AI 800-4, March 2026. ↩︎
OpenTelemetry, "Generative AI semantic conventions", Development status, accessed August 27, 2026. ↩︎
OWASP GenAI Security Project, "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency", 2025. ↩︎
OWASP Cheat Sheet Series, "LLM Prompt Injection Prevention", accessed August 27, 2026. ↩︎
CNCF TAG App Delivery, "CNCF Platforms White Paper", accessed August 27, 2026. ↩︎
Murugiah Souppaya, Karen Scarfone, and Donna Dodson, Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1, NIST SP 800-218, February 2022. ↩︎
SLSA community, SLSA specification, version 1.2, Linux Foundation, accessed August 27, 2026. ↩︎
OpenGitOps, "GitOps Principles, version 1.0.0", Linux Foundation, accessed August 27, 2026. ↩︎
NIST Computer Security Resource Center, "Control Loop", accessed August 27, 2026. ↩︎
Elham Tabassi, Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0), NIST AI 100-1, January 2023. ↩︎
Chloe Autio et al., Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile, NIST AI 600-1, July 2024. ↩︎
NIST, "AI Risk Management Framework", accessed August 27, 2026. ↩︎
European Parliament and Council, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Official Journal of the European Union, July 12, 2024, arts. 12, 19, and 26. ↩︎
FinOps Foundation, "FinOps Framework Principles" and "Unit Economics", accessed August 27, 2026. ↩︎
OWASP GenAI Security Project, "LLM10:2025 Unbounded Consumption", 2025. ↩︎